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The Role and the Positioning of the
Left in Serbia’s “One of Five Million”
Protests 
Le rôle et le positionnement de la Gauche dans le mouvement « Un sur cinq
millions » en Serbie
Jelena Pešić and Jelisaveta Petrović
1 The Great Recession (2008) provoked a series of demonstrations around the globe. In
many countries of the European Union (EU), protests initiated by the Institutional Left
and  various  autonomous  actors  manifested as  a  synergy  of  anti-austerity  and  pro-
democracy  demands.  A  significant  change  in  the  political  and economic  landscape,
especially in those countries heavily affected by the financial crisis, opened a window
of opportunity for greater public receptiveness to critiques of neoliberal capitalism. At
the same time, a democratic deficit was identified as one of the major culprits of the
financial crisis. The intertwining of the political and economic crises (which came to be
known as  a  “crisis  of  democratic  capitalism”)  created a  powerful  impetus for  mass
mobilisation of people across Europe.1 
2 Regardless  of  the  numerous  protests  that  shook  Europe  in  the  wake  of  the  global
economic  crisis,  the  onset  of  mass  protests  in  Serbia  came  almost  a  decade  later.
Despite several attempts, the first large demonstrations took place in Belgrade in 2016
(when citizens protested against the Belgrade Waterfront urban megaproject) and were
followed  by  the  “Against  Dictatorship”  protests  that  emerged  after  the  April  2017
presidential elections.2 Research on the “Against Dictatorship” protests showed that,
although  these  were  protests  in  a  “time  of  crisis,”  they  were  not  articulated  as
economic (anti-austerity) protests linked to the global crisis of capitalism. The protest
participants  were  mostly  young  people  with  middle-class  backgrounds3 and  they
framed the protest as anti-governmental, mainly focused on the corrupt practices of
government officials.4 By focusing on the “One of Five Million” protests that broke out
in late 2018, and the absence of its framing as an “economic” protest, in this paper we
explore  the  socio-historically  embedded  opportunities  and  barriers  for  political
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articulation,  mobilisation  and  institutionalisation  of  left-wing  movements  and
organisations  in  Serbia.  Moreover,  we address  the  question of  a  time-space bias  in
social  movement studies  which has  made it  difficult  to  analyse  post-socialist  social
movements of the capitalist semi-periphery. Mainstream explanatory frameworks have
been developed from the experiences of core countries,5 and as noted by Gagyi, 
Using the spatially biased ‘crisis of democratic capitalism’ framework to make sense
of  present  ECE movements  would put  serious limits  on their  understanding.  To
transcend  that  limit,  the  universality  of  the  ‘crisis  of  democratic  capitalism’
framework  needs  to  be  ‘provincialized’  (Chakrabarty,  2009),  and  the
conceptualization of European post war politics reintegrated in a global picture.6
3 In  this  study  we  undertake  the  task  of  demonstrating that,  despite  the  rising
opportunities for the Left to develop – provided by the global economic crisis coupled
with  the  adverse  socio-economic  outcomes  of  post-socialist  transformation  –  an
unfavourable discursive opportunity structure still presents a significant impediment
for the development of  left-wing political  parties  and movements in Serbia.  Due to
almost two decades of the stigmatisation and depreciation of communism/socialism
and the marginalisation of the Left in Serbia’s political arena, left-wing attempts to
frame the contemporary societal crisis as a crisis of neoliberal capitalism seem not to
resonate with the wider public. This lack of resonance also impeded the framing of the
“One of Five Million” protests as economic; it also impeded the possibility of relating
them  to  the  “double”  global  crisis  of  neoliberalism  and  representative  democracy.
Moreover, we address the question of the class base of the protests, claiming that semi-
peripheral  middle  classes  that  have  internalised  the  political  ideologies  of  Western
hegemonic  partners  (i.e.  neoliberal)7 reinforce  dominant  discursive  structures  that
further impede development of the Left.
 
Socio-historical context and the formation of the
(new) left-wing movement in Serbia
4 There is no easy way to define what the Left is today. The global collapse of socialist
regimes in 1989 led to an identity crisis for the European Radical Left, while the global
financial  crisis  spurred  a  revitalisation  and  proliferation  of  leftist  ideas  and  a
flourishing of left-wing organisations and movements.8 Today, the left spectrum ranges
from  socio-democratic  parties  and  groups  at  one  end,  through  left-leaning  green
groups and organisations, to traditional communist parties at the other.9 The diversity
of the  Left  is  not  only  contentious,  ideological  and  programmatic,  but  also
organisational: the Left is made up of institutionalised political parties, informal non-
party  and  subculture  groups, non-government  organisations,  movements,  alliances,
etc.  Furthermore,  Hildebrandt  and Daiber10 point  out  that  the  Left  presents  a  very
different picture in each individual  country,  resulting from different traditions and
political structures and from the identity differences of the various organisations. The
common denominator of these various forms is, however, the advocacy of social justice,
democracy, social security and a dignified life.11 
5 March12 identifies Radical and Extreme Left parties and groups as parts of the “Far Left”
political spectrum and distinguishes them from the New Left that has been recognised
by academics and researchers of social movements (for example, della Porta13). Radical
Left groups advocate for systemic changes to capitalism, but accept democracy (most
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often in the form of direct democracy and local participatory democracy). Their anti-
capitalist  orientation  includes  opposition  to  neoliberal  capitalism,  but  they  do  not
necessarily support a planned economy. The Extreme Left, on the other hand, shows
greater  hostility  to  liberal  democracy,  rejects  compromises  with  bourgeois  parties
(including social democrats), and advocates for extra-parliamentary struggle. Both the
Radical  and  Extreme  Left  identify  economic  inequalities  as  the  “basis  of  existing
political  and social  arrangements,”  pinning collective economic and social  rights as
their  principal  agenda.14 Some  of  these  groups  and  parties  participate  in  electoral
processes across Europe, although few are able to elaborate on the nature of, or road to,
socialism.15 
6 The New Left, on the other hand, developed from anti-austerity movements triggered
by the 2008 Great Recession. The designator “new” is used to distinguish these groups
both from the Old Left (communist parties) and contemporary Radical and Extreme Left
groups.  New  Left  groups  and  movements  exploit  themes  such  as  feminism,
environmentalism,  self-management,  direct  democracy,  local  participation,  etc.,
advocating non-dogmatic (non-Marxist)  socialism – or even democratic capitalism –
and supporting alternative lifestyles and various minorities.16 Most of these groups are
established  as  single-issue  movements,  reacting  to  the  specific  consequences  of
neoliberal reforms17 and suspension of democratic procedures and institutions. They do
not, however, develop a clear anti-capitalist agenda nor do they reject the institutions
of liberal democracy18.
7 The formation of the contemporary Left in Serbia started during the 1990s. At first,
these were mostly anti-capitalist  organisations and groups resting on revolutionary
traditions suppressed by the Communist  Party of  Yugoslavia during socialist  period
(e.g.  Trotskyism,  Maoism,  anarchism,  etc.).19 These  first  groups  were  formally  or
informally  organised  by  humanities  students  and  artists,  mostly  in  the  form  of
alternative  education  networks  or  platforms.  This  was  a  period  when  flirting  with
leftist  ideas  and theories  became popular  in  the  alternative  arts  scene  and also  at
universities. The first wave brought about a revised evaluation of the Yugoslav socialist
legacy, which came as a reaction to the defamation of socialist modernisation both in
public  and academic  discourses;  it  also  brought  about  the  revitalisation  of  Marxist
theory  which  had  been  marginalised  in  academia  during  the  previous  decade.20
Organised on the principles of self-education and gathering people in relatively small
circles, these first groups resembled similar initiatives active during the last decade of
the  socialist  period  (for  example,  informal  discussion  groups  organised  by  the
persecuted leaders of the 1968 demonstrations and left-wing activists and academics,
such as the Open University).
8 The process of neoliberal post-socialist transformation and the consolidation of semi-
peripheral  capitalism in Serbia21 had significant negative effects in almost all  social
spheres.  The  privatisation  of  public/state-owned  companies  resulted  in
deindustrialisation and massive job losses.22 The commercialisation of higher education
closed this channel of social mobility for a significant number of young people from the
lower  social  strata.23 Reforms  of  labour  legislation  considerably  reduced  workers’
rights.24 The  retraction  of  the  welfare  state  led  to  a  reduction  of  social  benefits,
gradually  shaping  the  social  protection  system  along  neoliberal  lines.25 Austerity
measures  contributed to  rising  social inequalities,26 while  the  official  suspension of
recruitment in the public sector27 compelled many young people to emigrate. Intensive
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investor urbanism led to the commodification of public spaces and overexploitation of
natural resources.28 Contrary to the experience of Western countries, the establishment
of democratic institutions in Serbia (free elections, rule of law, free media, etc.) did not
come before but together with neoliberal reforms, which means the country does not
fit easily into the narrative of the “crisis of democratic capitalism.”29 Nevertheless, all
of  these  issues  represent  grounds  on  which  different  left-wing  initiatives  arose  in
Serbia in the past two decades.
9 The negative consequences of neoliberal reforms in Serbia, coupled with the global rise
of  anti-globalisation  and  anti-austerity  movements,  the  “right  to  the  city”
mobilisations, and the emergence of new leftward realignments from traditional social-
democracy,30 refocused  the  activities  of  leftist  organizations  from  self-education,
theoretical  discussions  and  art  production  to  left-wing  activism  (e.g.  supporting
workers strikes,  student blockades,  protests  against  privatisation).  Left-wing groups
have made use of social media to increase their visibility and to recruit new members.31
In this phase, they started to more strongly connect with international anti-capitalist
organisations,  which provided organisational,  educational  and financial  support  for
capacity building. International foundations that support left-oriented activities (such
as  the  Rosa  Luxemburg  Foundation)  prompted  these  informal  left-wing  groups  to
formalise their legal statuses in order to be able to apply for grants. This “NGO-isation”
of the Left increased its capacities and diversified its activities (the rights of women,
LGBTQ,  Roma  and  other  minorities,  anti-war  campaigns,  etc.),  but  also  led  to  the
development of a “project-driven” orientation, ideological dilution and organisational
dispersion. Moreover, the increase in the number of leftist groups, now competing for
grants, led to the radicalisation of leftist discourses (especially online). Together with
unstable  membership  in  the  leftist  groups,32 ideological  and  organisational
fragmentation and competition are seen as the main obstacles preventing the anti-
capitalist left in Serbia from uniting and institutionalising its activities through a joint
political party.33 
10 Although many lines of division could be drawn between left-wing groups, here we
propose  one  which  could  be  useful  in  analysing  cleavages  in  the  Serbian  left-wing
political scene: a) the Radical Left  – nucleuses of cadre organisations stemming from
“revolutionary” communist or Trotskyist traditions (examples include Marx 21 [M21]
and the  Reds  Marxist  Organisation);  b)  the Reformist  Left  –  organisations  aiming to
establish a broader coalition of ideologically diverse left-wing groups (e.g. the Social
Democratic Union [SDU], the Left Summit and DiEM25); and c) the New Left – a number
of single-issue, anti-neoliberal movements, groups and organisations that do not have a
clear anti-capitalist  agenda (e.g.  Don’t  Let  Belgrade D(r)own [DLBD],  The Associated
Movement of Free Tenants [AMFT] and Local Front [LF]).
11 While various anti-capitalist left-wing groups have been active continuously since the
late 1990s and early 2000s, the New Left arose in the age of austerity.34 They organised
around local issues that stemmed from the implementation of neoliberal reforms and
were coupled with corruption and clientelism: the commodification of public spaces
and  urban  mega  projects  (e.g.  NDBD),  overblown  utility  bills  (e.g.  AMFT),  and  the
protection  of  local  ecosystems  (the  Say  No  to  Mini  Hydroelectric  Power  Plants
initiative). 
12 In organisational terms, the New Left mainly develops in the form of loosely organised,
horizontal,  grassroots  groups  based  on  the  principles  of  direct  democracy  and
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deliberation.35 The  Radical  Left  operates  through  a  number  of  smaller  cadre
organisations  with  variable  memberships  and  continuity.  The  third  category,  the
Reformist  Left,  is  still  in  the  process  of  reorganising in  an attempt  to  constitute  a
political party.
13 The  ideological  and  political  framing  of  left-wing  groups  also  varies.  Unlike  the
activities of the Radical and Reformist Left – whose demands mostly relate to economic
issues – the movements of the New Left engage simultaneously in both the political and
economic domains. As Dolenec et al. argue, 36New Left initiatives are at the same time
movements  of  affluence  and  movements  of  crisis.  This  is  because  they  oppose  the
capitalist  processes  of  enclosure  and dispossession,  but  also  articulate  demands for
democratisation, participation and alternative forms of governance. In comparison to
the New Left, The Radical Left in Serbia is clearly anti-capitalist, although programmes
of groups within it vary from acceptance of reforms within capitalism to advocacy for
some form of democratic socialism. 
14 Some leftist groups have elaborated their visions of the society they want to see (e.g. a
planned economy and democratic workers’ control over the state37 or the humanisation
of  capitalism38)  or  a  general  strategy  for  their  political  activities  (e.g.  principal
revolutionary orientation and commitment to the creation of workers states and world
communism).39 Other groups, however, mostly rely on vague ideas of partial reforms of
capitalism (e.g. reforms of the electoral system and state and local governance,40 social
security  system  reforms41).  In  spite  of  these  differences,  the  common  ideological
denominator for all groups belonging to the Left in Serbia rests in values of solidarity,
equality and social justice.
15 In terms of coalition capacity, most of the Radical Left groups reject the possibility of
joint  engagement  with  mainstream opposition parties  and participation in  political
processes and institutions (such as elections). The Reformist Left (SDU), on the other
hand, does not reject the possibility of taking part in the work of political institutions,
but rejects the possibility of joining the “mainstream” opposition. Finally,  the most
recognisable organisations of the New Left (such as DLBD) are embedded within the
corpus of mainstream political opposition and primarily oriented towards denouncing
the authoritarian tendencies of the ruling party. 
 
Conceptual framework
16 The recent  resurgence of  social  movements  across  the world objecting to  austerity
measures, rising inequality, the dispossession of rights and democratic deficits, raises
the question of their interconnectedness and the responsibility of the global capitalist
system for generating them.42 The failure of social movement theory to explain the
emergence of anti-austerity protests, and the risk of losing a sense of “the big picture,”
calls for the integration of political economy into the conceptual framework of social
movement studies.43 In other words,  the global  financial  crisis  and the rise of  anti-
austerity  movements  have  re-actualized  the  Marxist  approach  in  social  movement
theory, which had “strangely disappeared” despite it foundational importance (e.g. the
1970s work of Charles Tilly, Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow).44 The “Marxist turn” in
social  movement  scholarship  implies  bringing  capitalism  back  into  the  study  of
collective action,  as well  as taking into consideration the social  base and the wider
structural conditions in which protests take place.45
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17 While research prior to the global financial crisis provided strong evidence to support
the thesis that the social base of new left-wing movements in the West consists mainly
of the middle classes (in contrast to the working class base of the Old Left), research of
anti-austerity protests in EU countries indicates that mobilisation had shifted towards
the “multitude” or the “losers of neoliberal globalisation” of diverse social biographies:
public-sector employees; young people and the well-educated; traditional workers and
precarious workers; retired people and the unemployed.46 
18 In their call for the reintroduction of Marxist perspectives to social movement theory,
Hetland and Goodwin47 emphasise that the dynamics of capitalism and socio-economic
factors matter for social movements in several ways. Firstly, capitalist dynamics can
inhibit  but also facilitate the formation of new collective identities and solidarities,
thus  shaping  the  very  conditions  necessary  for  the  existence  of  many  social
movements.  Then,  the  balance  of  class  forces  in  a  society  can  shape  movements’
development,  goals,  strategies  and  outcomes.  Finally,  ideologies  closely  linked  to
capitalist institutions and practices may also strongly influence movement strategies
and goals.
19 One should, however, be cautious about applying theoretical models borrowed from the
West in trying to understand the dynamics of social movements at the periphery or
semi-periphery. For instance, it should not be taken for granted that semi-peripheral
middle  classes  and  social  movements  in  post-socialist  countries  have  the  same
characteristics  and  composition  as  their  counterparts  in  the  core  countries.48
Therefore,  we believe that localisation and pointing to the specificities of  the post-
socialist context are much needed for proper explanation of the development of leftist
movements in Serbia. One of the local specificities that should particularly be taken
into consideration is the pre-existing discursive opportunity structure (DOS).
20 The notion of DOS was introduced into social movement scholarship by Koopmans and
Statham (1999)  as  a  “cultural”  extension to political  process theory.  While  political
process  theory  stresses  the  influence  of  political  structures  on the  development  of
social  movements,49 the  framing  approach  emphasises  the  importance  of  the
construction of meaning by movement adherents and other actors.50 By combining the
two approaches, the concept of DOS recognises that the cultural and political contexts
facilitate  or  constrain  collective  action  framing  and,  thus,  make  some  movement
frames  more  resonant  and  effective  than  others.  On  the  one  hand,  this  concept
successfully overcomes the inadequacy of the “political opportunity approach” to deal
with the discursive content of social  movement mobilisation and, on the other,  the
difficulty that the framing perspective has in explaining why some frames fail while
others  succeed  in  mobilising  the  public.51 The  concept  of  discursive  opportunity
structure emphasises that social movement mobilisation is influenced both by political
institutions and by the culturally embedded, dominant interpretative frames. 
21 Between the two domains, a common ground has developed where both perspectives
refer  to  political-cultural  or  symbolic  external  constraints  and facilitators  of  social
movement  mobilization.  We  propose  to  denote  this  set  of  variables  by  the  term
discursive opportunity structure, which may be seen as determining which ideas are
considered ‘sensible’, which constructions of reality are seen as ‘realistic’, and which
claims are held as ‘legitimate’ within a certain polity at a specific time.52 
22 Further developing the concept, Koopmans and Olzak explain discursive opportunities
as “the aspects of the public discourse that determine a message’s chances of diffusion
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in the public sphere.”53 Ferree and colleagues make the distinction between the cultural
(widespread  values  and  beliefs  in  the  broader  population)  and  the  institutional
(mainstream/institutionalised discourse in the public arena) components of DOS.54
23 The concept of discursive opportunity structures provides protest and social movement
scholars with an adequate analytical tool to understand which movement frames will
likely  have the  capacity  to  mobilise  wider  support,  to  challenge and alter  targeted
policies  and  to  influence  and  shape/reshape  dominant  political  discourses.55 It  is
important  to  note,  however,  that  dominant  discursive  opportunity  structures  are
usually  not  straightforward  and  internally  coherent  but  contain  multiple  and
sometimes  conflicting  discourses,  thus  creating  a  particularly  difficult  terrain  for
collective actors to navigate.56
24 Arguing that messages that are not resonant can still be very important for challenging
the dominant discourses in society, Ferree57 makes a distinction between resonance and
radicalism. “Resonance is defined as the mutually affirming interaction of a frame with
a  discursive  opportunity  structure  supportive  of  the  terms  of  its  argument,  while
radicalism is similarly defined as a mutually contradictory relationship between this
structure and a frame.”58 Choosing to resonate with dominant discourses can bring
certain, short-term success to social movements, while electing to persist with radical
claim-making can bring far-reaching success in changing the dominant discourse.59
25 Social movements are usually composed of numerous organisations and groups that,
despite having an overarching goal, tend to differ greatly in terms of their strategies,
tactics, values, means and objectives. Disagreements are not rare, therefore, and often
pertain  to  a  movement’s  framing  activities.  Frame  disputes  are  conflicts  over  the
interpretation of reality and can occur in diagnosing the problem the movement seeks
to address;  in deciding what should be done in order to solve a particular problem
(prognosis);  and,  finally,  over  the  frame  alignment  strategies  (“frame  resonance
disputes”).60 Frame  disputes  often  occur  between  ideologically  diverse  wings  of  a
movement  –  for  example,  between  the  moderate  and  extreme  factions.  If  frame
disputes escalate, they can result in factionalisms but can otherwise be beneficial if
they allow grater frame resonance with the wider audience.61 
 
Data and methods
26 In this paper, we take the ‘‘One of Five Million’’ protests as a show-case to demonstrate
how local discursive opportunity structures, on the one hand, and the socio-economic
conditions  created  by  the  global  financial  crisis  and  neoliberal  post-socialist
transformation, on the other, affect the development and positioning of leftist groups
within Serbia’s  political  scene.  As  the most  visible  expression of  social  movements,
protests provide a good opportunity to study the actual behaviour (and not just official
proclamations) of social movement actors. Therefore, we mostly rely on the analysis of
protest events and the first-hand accounts of  protest participants,  while qualitative
analysis  of  the  websites  and  promotional  material  of  leftist  groups  is  used  as
complementary material. 
27 The analysis rests on the qualitative data from a larger research study62 of the “One of
Five Million” protests (March-April 2019), from which we derived a total of 15 semi-
structured interviews with the leaders of groups and parties involved in the protest.63
Complementarily, we used the protest survey data (n = 451) conducted in February 2019
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in Belgrade and desk analysis of the political programmes, website content and visual




28 The “One of Five Million” protests that broke out in Belgrade and many other towns in
Serbia in the autumn of 2018 lasted well over a year.64 At one point taking place in more
than one hundred towns across  the country,  these protests  represented the widest
outbreak of popular discontent since the collapse of the Milošević regime in 2000. The
immediate cause of the protests was an act of violence committed against an opposition
leader. Soon enough, however, the protest demands transcended the original cause,
expanding to include more wide-ranging criticism of the regime of Aleksandar Vučić.
The  branding  of  the  protest  as  ‘‘One  of  Five  Million’’  came in  the  wake  of  Vučić’s
statement that he would not meet the demands of the protesters even if they manage
to gather five million people. 
29 Aleksandar Vučić and the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (Srpska napredna stranka –
SNS), together with several other coalition partners, came to power following the 2012
parliamentary elections. In order to solidify its rule, the ruling party called for snap
parliamentary elections on two occasions, in 2014 and 2016, winning them both. In the
meantime, as acting prime minister, Vučić ran in the 2017 presidential elections and
won. The rule of the SNS, which has to date lasted eight years,  represents the first
extended period since the fall of the Milošević regime during which the ruling party
not  only  remained  in  government  following  an  election  but,  on  the  contrary,
consolidated its  power.  The regime’s  solidification process  has been marked by the
degradation of already weak institutions of representative democracy, control over the
judiciary,  party  use  of  public  media  and  corrupt  control  of  private  media,
circumvention  of  the  law,  expansion  and  strengthening  of  clientelistic  networks
between various actors associated with the ruling party, etc. Along with the process of
strengthening  authoritarian  tendencies  with  elements  of  personal  power,  the
consolidation of the regime was marked by the implementation of austerity measures
in response to the economic crisis. These were accompanied, on the one hand, by a
combination of further neoliberal reforms and the reduction of budget expenditures
for the most vulnerable categories and, on the other,  short-term populist  measures
aimed  at  gaining  the  support  of  the  electorate.65 Before  the  “One  of  Five  Million”
protests,  there  were  few  serious  attempts  by  the  opposition  to  consolidate  and
articulate popular discontent; the opposition had hitherto mostly sought to mobilise
the middle classes but generally ignored those categories of the population that were
most affected by neoliberal measures.66
30 Although  the  protests  did  not  have  official  leader(s),  at  the  time  this  study  was
conducted certain actors could be discerned as the main organisers. These comprised
the largest oppositional bloc gathered around Alliance for Serbia (Savez za Srbiju –
AFS);67 a  group of  students  who were active  in  the previous “Against  Dictatorship”
protests  (2017)  and  later  declared  themselves  to  be  the  official  organisers  of  the
protests;68 and a group of public intellectuals (university professors, actors, journalists
etc.). Despite the spontaneous outbreak of the protests, their polycentric organisation,
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and  its  own  ideological  leanings,  the  Alliance  for  Serbia  soon  became  the  most
important  coordinator.  The  Alliance  for  Serbia  consists  of  an  ideologically
heterogeneous coalition of political parties spanning from the political right to the left-
of-centre, with a concentration of parties in the political right and centre, and only a
principled  and  faint  articulation  of  traditional  leftist  ideas  of  social  justice  and
solidarity.  The protest demands,  articulated by the mainstream oppositional  parties
through the “Agreement with the People,”69 focused on media freedom, the rule of law
and free and fair elections.
 
Discursive opportunity structures, frame disputes and the
positioning of the Left
31 Since  the  beginning of  the  twenty-first century,  smaller  anti-capitalist  groups  have
been  active  all  around  South  Eastern Europe  (organised  student  protests,  workers
resisting  privatisation,  “right  to  the  city”  movements,  activities  opposing  forced
evictions  of  debtors,  local  initiatives  for  the  protection  of  the  public  good,
environmental protests, etc.). What distinguishes Serbia from some other ex-Yugoslav
countries (primarily Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia), however, is the failure of these
initiatives  to  become  institutionalised  in  the  form  of  a  political  party  that  would
articulate  contemporary left-wing politics.70 Unlike Croatia  and Slovenia,  where the
socialist  legacy  was  marginalised  in  the  public  discourse  in  the  early  1990s  and
opportunities opened in the early 2000s for new left-wing forces to be discovered and
actualised in the abandoned political space,71 Serbia continued to live in the shadow of
criticism of the Milošević regime and communism/socialism well into the 2000s. This
situation impeded left-wing movements from constituting a significant political actor
for  almost  two  decades.  As  a  member  of  the  Reformist  Left  group  SDU  noted,  in
comparison to the other former-Yugoslav countries, "an additional problem is that we
need to bring back the Left into the political mainstream .... We don’t only have the
problem  of  the  SFRY  [Socialist  Federative  Republic  of  Yugoslavia],  Tito,  but  also
Milošević." 
32 The first post-socialist  regime,  led  by the  former leader  of  the  Serbian Communist
Party  Slobodan  Milošević  (1990-2000),  employed  a  hybrid  combination  of  socialist
(social  justice  and  working-class  rights)  and  nationalist  ideology  as  a  mobilisation
platform in order to retain legitimacy and uphold the privileges of the ruling party.72
Regime change in 2000 was marked by a strict break with Milošević’s legacy, especially
in terms of socialism and leftist ideas, and the introduction of a (neo)liberal agenda.
With this change, “the baby was thrown out with the bathwater” and the values of
social equality, solidarity and workers’ rights were marginalised in the newly formed
public discourse. As one of the respondents from a Radical anti-capitalist group, M21,
noted: “We have the continuity of the powerful anti-communist discourse [...]. Even the
Democratic Party that tends to represent itself as the party on the centre left, has an
anti-communist discourse.”
33 Due to the legacy of the Milošević regime, the political Left lost much of its ability to
mobilise people after regime change in 2000. To the contrary, right-wing and populist
parties and movements have flourished, especially among those social categories whose
structural position in capitalism worsened (the so-called losers of transition). It should
be  noted,  however,  that  even  though  this  legacy  is  the  most  distinctive  factor
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constraining the formation of a strong left-wing movement, its importance is gradually
fading with generational shift. The political socialisation of the younger generations
who are active in the new left-wing movements and groups is largely taking place in a
post-Milošević political context.73 
34 While Milošević’s legacy and the dominant discursive structures should be understood
to be a significant barrier to the development of left-wing movements in Serbia, certain
global and local processes are opening up possibilities for a rise of the Left. One of these
processes relates to the global crisis of neoliberal capitalism that has emerged since
2008.74 The  adverse  effects  of  the  implementation  of  neoliberal  policies,  especially
austerity  measures  and  periodic  suspensions/manipulation  of  liberal  democratic
procedures and institutions by ruling political elites, has contributed to the growing
importance of the left-wing political movements around the world.75 
35 The brief success of social democratic parties and left-wing movements across Europe
(Podemos, Syriza), put the wind back in the sails of some political parties in Serbia to
(declaratively, at least) move leftwards in their political profiling. While there were,
however, some attempts by both mainstream opposition and ruling parties to present
themselves as the Left, the “genuine” Left, especially its radical wing, remains on the
political margins. As a respondent from M21 put it:
The Left is completely marginalised. There are, in fact, small political groups that
act on the margins [...]. We have left liberals in the Civic Front, who, like all left
liberals, can easily become servants of the Right. We have the fake Left, political
parties that represent themselves as the Left, but just try to attract voters on the
basis  of  Milošević’s  legacy  […].  There  is  no  real,  articulated  Left  in  the
representative bodies.
36 Despite  the marginalisation of  the Left,  members  of  leftist  groups see a  window of
opportunity opened by the crisis of neoliberalism and the increasingly visible negative
outcomes of  neoliberal  reforms in Serbia.  “We wanted to use the highly politicised
situation in society and to articulate our demands” (Respondent, M21). They believe
that people are steadily becoming aware that the post-socialist transformation is over,
and  that  the  struggles  faced  by  the  majority  of  the  population  are  inherent  to
capitalism on the semi-periphery. Said a respondent of SDU:
The “sobering up” is about to come and it will open a space for the Left to return
[…] and that fear that if someone labels you as the Extreme Left, you will be pushed
to the margins [...] I do not think that’s the case anymore [...]. Time has revealed at
least some of the lies – first of all, that the transition will lead somewhere [...]. To
the extent that these lies are revealed, I think that there is some understanding in
the public for radical left-wing policies.
37 However, said another, “here, many problems and manifestations of capitalism are still
not  recognised and articulated.”  Therefore,  left-wing groups,  especially  the  Radical
Left, used the “One in Five Million” protests to raise awareness of the social problems
created by capitalism, to increase the visibility of their work, to reach their supporters,
to mobilise bystanders and to position themselves in the mainstream of the political
scene. They decided to participate in the protest in order, “to use the politicisation of
society, for our activities, to carry out a kind of propaganda activity, that is, to ride on
the wave of media visibility created by this protest” (Respondent, M21). 
38 This task, however, proved to be quite difficult. Alternatives to capitalism articulated
by the Left were ridiculed openly by leaders of other political parties involved in the
protest, reinforcing unfavourable discursive structures maintained by all governments
The Role and the Positioning of the Left in Serbia’s “One of Five Million” Pr...
Balkanologie, Vol. 15 n° 2 | 2020
10
since 2000 and weakening the position of the Left within the protest. As described by a
respondent of AFS:
And which system, besides capitalism, exists?! [...] Where do you have socialism?
Give me one country in the world that is not North Korea or some tribal community
in Africa, where the economic model is not capitalist. I mean, I really don’t know
how serious people can talk about that […] to restore self-management [...]  that
everyone should have according to their needs, it’s nonsense.
39 Media with a pro-opposition stance did not remain neutral in creating unfavourable
discursive opportunities. Thus, in the midst of the protests, the editor of the respected
weekly  Vreme called  representatives  of  the  Marx  21  organisation  a  “regime
international,”  mockingly  attributing  to  them  that  they  wanted  to  prevent  the
opposition from blunting the revolutionary edge of the masses.76Meanwhile a columnist
for the well-known Peščanik media outlet drew parallels between the Radical Left in
Serbia and Milošević’s former party, the Socialist Party of Serbia, identifying socialism
with contemporary regimes in North Korea, China, and Venezuela, or with the nuclear
catastrophe in the Soviet Union.77
40 The heterogeneity of  the Left  –  considered in terms of  its  three major divisions of
Radical, Reformist and New, the lack of an overreaching goal and unifying collective
identity,  the  internal  frame  disputes,  and  different  protest  tactics  and  coalition
capacities – has further undermined the position of the Left within the protests, thus
diminishing its potential to challenge dominant discursive structures and frame the
current crisis as a crisis of capitalism. 
41 The  physical  participation  of  the  New  Left  in  the  protests  was  not  always  visible
(especially in Belgrade). This was because these groups held to the agreement with the
organisers  not  to  expose  organisation  symbols.  Although they  initially  coordinated
protest activities with the other organisers, the Alliance for Serbia eventually co-opted
the  protests  and  offered  the  “Agreement  with  the  People.”  Thereafter,  local
organisations united into the Civil Front78 and decided not to join the Alliance.
42 The Radical and Reformist Left entered the protest separately from New Left groups, at
first as part of the Roof Overhead platform. Following a series of disagreements among
the organisations within this umbrella initiative,79 the platform withdrew, while the
Radical and Reformist Left stayed in the protests under the name Left Bloc.80 The Left
Bloc’s involvement in the protests was distinct from that of other groups: they marched
separately, displayed their symbols (banners, flags, protest slogans against capitalism,
etc.) and put forward their own protest demands related to the existential problems of
the socially vulnerable categories: poverty, precarious work conditions, etc. The most
visible  banner  carried  the  slogan,  “Down  with  Vučić,  down  with  capitalism!” By
drawing  symbolic  boundaries  between  themselves  and  the  other  parties  and
organisations in the protest (including New Left groups), the Left Bloc positioned itself
as a group that expressed its opposition to all parties that had been in power since 2000
(some of which were part of the Alliance for Serbia) and to their neoliberal politics. 
43 On  several  occasions,  the  protests  were  marked  by  conflicts  between  the  protest
organisers and the Alliance for Serbia with supporters of the Left Bloc. This resulted in
Left  Bloc withdrawing  from the  protests  when “the  protests  were  co-opted  by  the
Alliance  for  Serbia” (Respondent,  SDU).  They  were  aware  of  the  possibility  that,
“breaking up the protests was, from the start, one of the things that was in some kind
of footnote, as a possible outcome [...]. So, our position was that [...] either we will make
The Role and the Positioning of the Left in Serbia’s “One of Five Million” Pr...
Balkanologie, Vol. 15 n° 2 | 2020
11
our bloc in the protest strong or we will show that the protest is bullshit” (Respondent,
M21). For its part, the Alliance for Serbia and its media tried to discredit the Radical
Left  by linking left-wing ideas – primarily anti-capitalism – with Milošević’s  legacy.
They also accused the Left Bloc of being “Vučić’s project to obstruct the protest.”81 On
the other hand, the New Left’s Don’t Let Belgrade Drown initiative and the Local Front
remained in the protests and were considered as acceptable partners by the Alliance
for Serbia.
44 The protests revealed a lack of unity and several lines of division between left-wing
organisations  and  groups.  Besides  that  already  outlined  (between  the  Radical  and
Reformist  Left  on  one  side  and  the  New  Left  on  the  other),  it  seems  that  groups
belonging to the Radical  and Reformist  Left  were also not  united in terms of  their
involvement in the protests. There were differences between those groups who joined
the protests and those who refused to join, but there were also differences in terms of
the strategy of their involvement.  A divergence of opinion appeared between those
advocating direct conflict with the mainstream opposition parties in the protests and
those who opposed such conflict. 
45 A representative of the Radical Left group M21 testified to the lack of unity on the left
regarding involvement in the protests:
After a few weeks, within Roof Overhead, the opinion prevailed that we should not
participate  in  the  protest.  So,  essentially,  [...]  there  is  this  conflict  of  one
“purifying” concept  of  politics,  which says  that  these protests  are organised by
Đilas and Dveri, and we will not get dirty by going there [...]. And, of course, Left
Bloc was criticised from exactly that position: how can you go to the protests where
the right-wingers are marching with you, where the flag of Russia is standing? [...]
they show that people are in some kind of pre-political state.
46 The New Left was also not a homogeneous entity (in terms of its vision of a desired type
of society or the level of acceptance of systemic changes).  If,  however,  the protests
revealed a number of difficulties and obstacles for the unification of the Radical and
Reformist  Left,  they  were  at  the  same  time  a  platform  that  enabled  New  Left
organisations and movements to consolidate into a joint platform, the Civic Front. “The
protests  directed us to each other,  we started networking,  discussing,  and we have
finally realised that there are a lot of people like us and that we are responsible for
change [...].  On the other hand,  other social  circumstances did not allow the leftist
groups to occupy this  space because of  this  enormous negative label” (Respondent,
AMFT).  They  hoped  the  protests  would,  “bring  a  positive  shift  towards  better
organisation of progressive left movements” (Respondent, DLBD). Unification of New
Left organisations into the Civic Front, however, simultaneously dissociated them from
the Radical and Reformist Left. 
47 The protest  demands were  narrowed down in  the  “Agreement  with the People”  to
strictly political  concerns with a pronounced absence of  the socio-economic aspect.
Most  of  the  respondents  belonging  to  the  New  Left  pointed  out  that  the  political
demands were crucial: “As far as we are concerned, there are three basic demands. The
first one is to stop political violence; the second is to have fair media representation [...]
and  the  third  is  to  have  fair  elections”  (Respondent,  DLBD).  On  the  contrary,  the
representatives of the Radical and Reformist Left criticised the protests and organisers
for ignoring social and economic demands: 
[...]  demands against  political  violence and for the restructuring of  the political
scene in Serbia are completely okay, but what is unacceptable is the fact that such
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mass protests don’t deliver social demands […]. All  the protest demands […] are
built on the narrative that we live in a dictatorship […] that there are no political
freedoms,  therefore,  simply,  something  that  the  middle  class  can  relate  to  [...] 
(Respondent, M21). 
48 The  Radical  and  the  Reformist  Left  tried  to  frame  the  protests  as  economic,  anti-
austerity, and anti-capitalist but, in the end, they were not successful because, among
other things, there was a lack of support not only from the mainstream opposition but
also from the New Left. 
 
The class base of the “One of Five Million” protests
49 The “One of Five Million” protests in Belgrade and some of the other larger cities in
Serbia were middle-class  protests.  While  the social  background of  the protesters  in
smaller towns was mixed, a survey of protest participants in Belgrade showed that the
majority  of  them  belonged  to  the  urban  middle  class  with  a  predominance  of  the
employed (58%) and students (24%). The protest participants (the so-called civic elite)
were those whose interests overcome purely economic issues and who seek to improve
their quality of life by demanding more democracy, media freedom and the rule of law.
82 This  was  the  case  in  some  other  post-socialist  countries  where  middle  classes
protested to  maintain their  status  in  the context  of  economic crisis83 or  aspired to
achieve living standards comparable to their counterparts in the West.84
50 “The ruling Serbian Progressive Party demonised the ‘civic elite’ [...] they antagonised
this particular social group and worked on mobilisation, on the recruitment of all other
groups”  (Respondent,  M21).  Therefore,  the  leaders  of  the  mainstream  opposition
parties, especially the Alliance for Serbia, intended to mobilise this particular social
group – the highly educated middle class from urban centres.
51 On the other hand, as a member of the Radical Left noted, “[…] people who have to
struggle  with  the  real  social  problems,  they  are  underrepresented  in  the  protest,
because these protests do not have anything to offer to them […] no clear social agenda
[…]” (Respondent, M21). The evident absence of people from the lower social strata, the
“losers of transition/neoliberalism” in these protests is assumed to be related to their
fear of losing the minimal social security they have. “People are frightened [...] with
their  insecure  socio-economic  position  [...]  they  are  afraid  to  protest,”  observed  a
respondent belonging to the SDU.  Therefore,  groups gathered around the Left  Bloc
concluded that “the central  problem of democracy in Serbia is  [...]  neither political
violence nor the stolen elections [...] nor the media blockade. The central problem of
democracy in Serbia is poverty” (Respondent, SDU).
52 One of the specificities of the rise of left-wing movements and organisations in Serbia
pertains  to  structural  changes  in  the  post-socialist  context.  State  control  of  trade
unions that were unable (or too inefficient) to organise more wide-ranging collective
action for the protection of workers’ rights resulted in a huge drop in membership.
This lack of collective action largely contributed to the atomisation and fragmentation
of the working class after the collapse of socialism.85 Furthermore, political support for
working-class issues was lacking: nominally socio-democratic (parliamentary) political
parties  turned  towards  the  right,  often  forming  coalitions  in  governments  that
implemented neoliberal policies and completely neglected workers’ rights. Without the
expected state support  and leadership,  resistance by working-class  organisations to
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neoliberal reforms  or  privatisation  processes  was,  therefore,  rather  weak  and
fragmented throughout the whole process of post-socialist transformation. Over time,
workers found themselves, as a group, without the resources necessary for collective
action.86 
53 The Radical Left also faced a problem that was not specific to Serbia: the loss of the
class  base for  the ideas  it  promoted.  The deindustrialisation process  decimated the
working class across Europe, and spurred a further heterogenisation of the remaining
part of the class. In addition to that, as Vuković87 noted, the Radical Left is faced with
an  evident  social  gap  between  the  (mostly  middle-class)  bearers  of  contemporary
socialist ideas and the class whose interests it supposedly expresses. As a respondent
from the New Left Local Front noticed: “In Serbia, [...] we have lefties, advocating for
workers’ rights, […] without seeing a worker in their life. They do not know what life
looks like in Vranje, where people work ten hours a day for 26,000 dinars. And they
never asked any of the workers: ‘do you want me to be your political representative?’”
54 Given the socio-economic background of the majority of protest participants, there was
a discussion within the Radical Left groups about whether to participate in the protest
at all. As they noticed, those who are protesting, “don’t experience the problems we are
dealing with as serious enough or even as a problem at all” (Respondent, SDU). They
decided to take part,  however,  assuming that,  “a serious change will  not happen if
there is no social coalition between [...] the disadvantaged class and the progressive
part  of  the  middle  class  [...]”  (Respondent,  SDU).  Therefore,  like  the  mainstream
opposition and the New Left, they saw the protests as an opportunity to address the
middle class, especially those segments which are, “undecided, who don’t understand
what  is  going  on”  (Respondent,  M21)  and  are  not  aware  of  the  underlying  socio-
economic processes.
55 The New Left, on the other hand, worked on creating narratives that did not question
capitalism  per  se,  but  rather  addressed  issues  arising  from  the  consequences  of
neoliberal policies. Unlike the Radical and Reformist Left, it seems that in this way the
New  Left  managed  to  strengthen  its  support  among  middle-class  protestors.  The
aforementioned survey of the protests provided evidence that the majority of young
professionals living in central Belgrade municipalities were supporters of the DLBD. A
respondent belonging to the core of  this  organisation describes their  supporters as
belonging  to  the  “middle,  urban,  highly-educated  social  strata  from  Belgrade  city
centre.” A focus on the local issues, on the one hand, and on the critique of clientelist
structures  and  authoritarian  rule  on  the  other,  also  tends  to  resonate  better  with
middle-class  beliefs  and  values  than  the  discourses  employed  by  the  mainstream
opposition or the anti-capitalist left. Suspicious of politics and grand ideologies, the
middle classes are striving to distance themselves from both discredited professional
politicians who no longer represent their ideals and interests and from radical ideas
which call into question their social position. 
 
Conclusions
56 Based  on  the  case  study  of  the  “One  of  Five  Million”  protests,  this  paper  tried  to
demonstrate  that left-wing  movements  in  Serbia  face  significant  challenges  in
penetrating  the  public  arena  and  rupturing  the  solidified  discursive  structures
characterised  by  the  deeply  held  and  taken-for-granted  belief  that  (neoliberal)
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capitalism has no alternative – a belief that has been developing gradually since regime
change in 2000. Moreover, rising individualism and political cynicism have resulted in
declining capacities for political organisation on the basis of solidarity and collective
interests,88 making traditional left-wing ideas generally unattractive and even repellent
due to the negative connotations related to the legacies of the Milošević regime and
socialism. 
57 Although the re-evaluations of (neoliberal) capitalism that emerged in the wake of the
global  economic  crisis  could  have  represented  a  platform  for  firmer  and  clearer
articulation of left-wing politics in Serbia, we saw that this opportunity was not fully
exploited.  Leftist  organisations  participated in  the  protests,  attempting to  generate
frame resonance with part of the middle class and the “losers of transition” by tapping
into their economic hardships and their feelings of discontent, injustice and unfairness.
Still,  their  fundamental  critique  of  capitalism  did  not  seem  to  resonate  with  the
targeted  audiences.  Leftist  organisations  in  Serbia  remained  mostly  invisible  to
“ordinary  citizens”  and were  relegated to  the  margins  of  the  oppositional  political
scene.  An  unfavourable  discursive  opportunity  structure,  fragmentation  and  low
capacities, combined with the dominantly middle-class base of the protests, disabled
left-wing groups. The Left was unable to highlight issues related to the outcomes of
neoliberal reforms and austerity measures as a part of the protest agenda and could not
mobilise the “multitude” of “losers of neoliberalism.” Instead, societal problems were
framed as political, and the protests were directed against authoritarian government.
This strategy also blurred the fact  that authoritarian political  regimes are far from
atypical  for  the  capitalist  periphery.89 It  should  not  be  surprising,  therefore,  that
crucial  political  actors  are  still  failing  to  articulate  political,  social  and  economic
problems as a crisis of capitalism on the semi-periphery.
58 Although the “One of Five Million” protests were part of a larger wave of protests “in
the time of crisis,” we should be careful about interpreting them with a reliance on the
explanatory  framework  of  a  “crisis  of  democratic  capitalism”  without  taking  into
account the specific context of the semi-periphery. The conceptual apparatus proposed
by della Porta90 and other authors advocating for the need to enrich the theory of social
movements  by  re-introducing  the  political  economy  approach  in  the  context  of  a
double  crisis  of  capitalism has  to  be  further  assessed  by  examining  the  conditions
which  obstruct  left-wing  groups  and  movements  at  the  semi-periphery  from
articulating this “double crisis” as fundamentally economic and social.
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ABSTRACTS
The political and economic crisis that followed the Great Recession (2008) created an impetus for
mass mobilisation across Europe, protesting austerity measures or demanding more democracy.
In Serbia, the protests organised under the slogan “One of Five Million,” which broke out in late
2018, were not framed as “economic” but solely as “political.” This paper explores the socio-
historically embedded opportunities and barriers for the political articulation, mobilisation and
institutionalisation of left-wing movements and organisations in Serbia by focusing on their role
in the “One of Five Million” protests. We demonstrate that despite greater prospects for the rise
of the Left, stemming from the global economic crisis and the adverse socio-economic outcomes
of the post-socialist transformation in Serbia, an unfavourable discursive opportunity structure
still  presents a significant impediment for the development of  left-wing political  parties and
movements.
La  crise  politique  et  économique  qui  a  suivi  la  Grande  Récession  (2008)  a  créé  un  élan  de
mobilisation de masse dans toute l’Europe, protestant contre les mesures d’austérité introduites
par les gouvernements ou exigeant plus de démocratie. En Serbie, les mobilisations regroupées
derrière  la  bannière  «  Un sur  cinq  millions  »  qui  ont  éclaté  à  la  fin  de  2018  n’ont  pas  été
formulées comme relevant de l’« économique », mais uniquement du « politique ». Cet article
étudie les opportunités et les obstacles socio-historiques spécifiques auxquels ont fait face des
mouvements et des organisations de gauche en Serbie dans leur expression, leur mobilisation et
leur institutionnalisation,  en se  concentrant sur leur rôle  dans le  mouvement «  Un sur cinq
millions  ».  Nous  démontrons  qu’en  dépit  des  opportunités  d’ascension  pour  la  Gauche
qu’offraient  la  crise  économique  globale  et  les  résultats  socio-économiques  négatifs  de  la
transformation  post-socialiste  en  Serbie,  une  structure  d’opportunités  discursive  défavorable
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